As a follow up to my previous post on online banking security products, a UK company, Network Intercept,is now selling a product called Secure-Me, which could be distributed on a USB key and  fires up a “secure” web browser which encrypts all traffic traveling to and from a user’s device. The product also features malware scanning, file encryption capabilities, virtual keyboard, and keystroke interference software to thwart hardware and software key-loggers. It currently supports Windows XP, Vista, Windows 7 and Mac OS X operating systems and  Android, iPhone, Symbian and Windows Mobile platforms.

Steganography is the means of “hiding” information within a larger file of data It poses a risk to ecommerce security because it allows data or malicious programming instructions to be hidden in other media. In the case of the former, malicious insiders (i.e. employees, contractors, etc) with access to customers financial data may improperly access that data and use steganography to forward it to their accomplices without being detected. In the case of the latter, hackers can embed malicious code in other files, such as images, audio and video files. These files can be forwarded to users as spam or made available via web sites and peer-to-peer networks in the guise of items that would attract the interest of web surfers.

Digital steganography requires special software and organizations involved in ecommerce can mitigate the risk of insiders using steganography to steal customer data by controlling the applications that can be installed on employee workstations. Network and Host-based Intrusion Detection Systems can also be used to detect unusually behavior. User education and awareness training can help make users more aware of the risk posed by downloading files from the Internet. Users can also be trained to verify the origin and authenticity of files using the hash files before downloading them.

If one suspects his/her financial information has been compromised by any means, including steganography, one should immediately communicate the fact to all affected financial institutions and close the affected accounts. Keeping an updated antivirus provides some level of protection however antivirus is ineffective against malware whose signature hasn’t been provided by the vendor. Often times, it is nearly impossible to detect ecommerce-based attacks until after the fact. It is important to closely monitor your accounts for unusual activities to be able to respond as quickly as possible

Did you hear the one about the bot that attacked the other bot and killed it? O but not before stealing your online banking credentials, that is.

Security researchers say that the relatively unknown [Spy Eye toolkit] added this functionality just a few days ago in a bid to displace its larger rival, known as Zeus.

The feature, called “Kill Zeus,” apparently removes the Zeus software from the victim’s PC, giving Spy Eye exclusive access to usernames and passwords.

Zeus and Spy Eye are both Trojan-making toolkits, designed to give criminals an easy way to set up their own “botnet” networks of password-stealing programs. These programs emerged as a major problem in 2009, with the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation estimating last October that they have caused $100 million in losses.

Trojans such as Zeus and Spy Eye steal online banking credentials. This information is then used to empty bank accounts by transferring funds to so-called money mules — U.S. residents with bank accounts — who then move the cash out of the country.

Read the full article

Ross Anderson reports:

Online transactions with credit cards or debit cards are increasingly verified using the 3D Secure system, which is branded as “Verified by VISA” and “MasterCard SecureCode”. This is now the most widely-used single sign-on scheme ever, with over 200 million cardholders registered. It’s getting hard to shop online without being forced to use it.

In a paper I’m presenting today at Financial Cryptography, Steven Murdoch and I analyse 3D Secure. From the engineering point of view, it does just about everything wrong, and it’s becoming a fat target for phishing. So why did it succeed in the marketplace?

Quite simply, it has strong incentives for adoption. Merchants who use it push liability for fraud back to banks, who in turn push it on to cardholders. Properly designed single sign-on systems, like OpenID and InfoCard, can’t offer anything like this. So this is yet another case where security economics trumps security engineering, but in a predatory way that leaves cardholders less secure. We conclude with a suggestion on what bank regulators might do to fix the problem.